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August 1~,-1963STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., r.10NTANA)
CHINESE-RUSSIAN CONVERGENCE IN ASIA
Mr. President:
There are obvirrJS reasons

o~

health and skyrocketing costs

armaments which provide common or parallel motives

~or

o~

the Soviet Union

and the United States to have sought the Test Ban Treaty .

Beyond the

obvious, other interests have undoubtedly entered into the search for
agreement by each nation.

These are not necessarily shared interests

but nevertheless they are a part of the calculatio::ls of the balance of
benefit on which the Treaty rests.
It seems to me that the Senate should explore all of these
factors in an effort to understand fully what is at stake in the act of
ratification.

Reference, for example, has already been made in the

hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee to the growing estrange ment between Russia and China.

That the question has been raised suggests

an awareness of •rhat may be a most significant factor in the Soviet position on the

r~uclear

Test Ban Tree. ty .

Yet our knowledge of the Russian-

Chinese estrangement is too limited to permit a full comprehension of its
implications either for Soviet policy or our own.

For one thing, our

reportorial coverage of the U.S.S . R. , particularly east of the Urals, is
extremely limited and spasmodic.

For another, our knowledge of what is

transpiring in China comes to us largely second- or third-hand.
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It is understandable, therefore, that the Sino-Soviet estrangement has been analyzed in the press and elsewhere largely in theoretical
terms.

technicians pore over

Scholars, journalists and intelligence

the documentation and statements and reports which emanate from Russia and
China.
almost

~d

in this fashion, the

whol~

estr~.gement

is interpreted to the

~ation

in terms of ideological differences and the struggle to claim

the high-priesthood of orthodoxy in the international Communist movement
and with it, I suppose, the right to preach the eulogy at the burial of
Capitalism.
These ideological factors are undoubtedly deeply invol ved and I
,.,ould not for a mCJJcnt underestimate them.

But if I may be so bold as to

suggest it, it seems to me that the great emphasis which is given to them
in the information which reaches the government and the public may produce
a serious uistortion of our concept of the actual situation.

We may see

the problem largely as a clash of Marxist theories or Communist personali ties which is destined to disappear as soon as the theories are straightened
out or the present leaders, in time, go the way of all leaders.
I should like to suggest that other, more

m~udane

and endurine

considerations are involved in present Sino-Soviet difficulties, considerations which will not easily be exorcised either by new theories or new
leaders .
It is to one of these considerations that I direct the attention
of the Senate today.

It may well be the most significant factor, in the

Russian- Chinese estrangement, largely overlooked in the overwhelming
emphasis which has been given to the ideological differences between

Moscow and Peking.

I refer to the geographic and cultural convergence of

Russia and China in the inner recesses of the Asian continent.

- 3This convereence,

fljr.

President, has been a source of intermittent

friction between the two countries for a very long time .

It has persisted

irrespective of the ideological inclinations of Moscow and Peking at any
given time in history.
and even Russia.

It long predates the advent of Communism in China

Indeed, it predates the birth of Karl Marx by at least

a century.
The first recorded clashes between Russians and Chinese go back
to the 17th century.

Three hundred years ago, Russian traders and Cossacks

first made contact with the outposts of
the region north of

M~nchuria .

Chinese-~~chu

imperial power in

The early zone of Russian influence and

authority in this desolate northeast corner of Asia, as against China, was
established by a series of treaties

begi~i~g

with that of Nerchinsk in

1689, and followed by Bur and Kiulmta in 1727, Kiakhta in 1768, and the
Kiakhta protocol in 1792.

A half-century later the Russian press southeast-

ward was resumed under Count Nikolai Muraviev-Amursky, the Governor General
of Eastern Siberia, and his chief military aid, Captain Gennadii Ivanovich
Nevelskoi.

Again there followed a consolidation of the Russian position,

in the Treaty of Aigun of 1858.

This agreement brought into Russian posse9ion

large areas of Northeast Asia which had previously been under Manchu control.
Subsequently, Russia as well as other European powers and Japan
exacted by guile, bribery or naked power, special economic privileges and
territorial concessions from weak and corrupt imperial officials of China.
By

this process, the Russians penetrated south into Manchuria, establishing

themselves at Dairen and Port Arthur on the Yellow Sea by the end of the
19th century and

penetrati~g

Korea which had been for a long time in a

tributary relationship with Peking.

- 4 Since that high -water mark, Russian influence in Northeast Asia
at the expense of China

· ~s

fluctuated .

In the face of a Japanese advance

and the weakness of the early Soviet state, it receded.

Under the Ccnmunism

of Stalin it advanced once more at the end of World Har II .

And under the

Communism of Khrushchev it receded once more after the Chinese Communists
came to power in Peking.

Our sources of information are insufficient to provide a clear
delineation of where the present line of convergence may lie, as between
Russian aud Chinese influence in Northeast Asia .

We are not even sure of

vThat the precise situation i n this connection may be in Kcrea where
de€.ply involved, let alone in Manchuria, of 'vhich

we

we

are

know very little.

One

thing is reasonably certain, however, the actual Russian-Chinese conversion
does not bear much relationship to the border-demarcations as shown on
ordinary maps.

It is also clear, in any event, that the convergence in

the Northeast is still much further south and east of a'\Y line vtbich would
have been recognized by a Ching emperor of the Manchu Dynasty in the 17th
century, the 18th or early 19th century .
The

rece~t

history of the Chinese -Russian convergence in Northeast

Asia has been affected, of course, by the appearance of Communist ideology
in Russia and China .

But sufficient experience is now accumulated to

suggest that the future history of the region will hardly be dominated by
this factor .
And the history of the Northeast, a history of Russian advance
and recession and advance --sometimes warlike and imperious and sometimes
peacefUl and conciliatory--finds parallels elsewhere in Central Asia.
During the last century, for example, Mongolia was entirely under nominal
Chinese sovereignty.

It was largely the efforts of Russians under

th~

Czars coupled with the weakness of the later Manchu -Ching emperors which

- 5brought about a loosening of Chinese control over the vast stretches of
land now identified as the Outer Mongolian People's Republic.

And it was

largely the same combination of Soviet strength and Chinese weakness under
the Chinese National Republic which resulted in 1922, in the establishment
of an Outer Mongolia, not only independent of China but brought progressively
into a relationship, apparently in the nature of a protectorate, with the
U.S.S.R.
South and west of Outer Mongolia we find in Sinkiang the same
flo,.,, ebb and flow of Russian influence.

Here, as elsewhere there was for

centuries a tradition of Chinese suzerainty over small principalities of
trloal peoples .

But here as elsewhere this suzerainty has been quite

devoid of significance in the absence of strong Chinese central power to
assert it.

Thus, in the last century, the Southwest edges of Sinkiang were

chipped away and added to what is now the contiguous territory of the

U.s.s.R.

And even as rece:t1tly a:;; World

\-Tar

II the Russians exercised for

a time scmething close to indirect domination over principal trading centers
and caravan junctions in Sinkiang.
Especially, since the advent of Chinese Cammunist control over
the mainland, the line of convergence as

betwe~n

Russia and China in the

Sinkiang area has apparently been pushed back westward once again.

But

how far and how firm this recession of Soviet influence has been, we do
not really know with any degree of accuracy.
To recapitulate, Mr. President, I have sought to point out to the
Senate , that, historically, there has been not a fixed but a shifting and
uncertain line of convergence between Russia and China in the inner recesses
of the Asian continent.

This line, Mr. President, is not necessarily the

border as shown on contemporary maps but rather the changing extremity of
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the eastward and

south~-rard

reach of Russian influence and the westernmost

and northernmost extension of enforceable Chinese control.
Further, history indicates that while there have been periods of
stalemate and recession, the over -all pattern in the region for several
centuries was that of Russian advance.

It was an advance which paralleled

roughly the spastic but steady decay of the Manchu-Ching dynasty through
the reigns of a number of emperors.

And it drew strength from the debili-

tation of the successor Chinese Republic in World l·lar II and the collapse
of the Japanese intrusion on the Asian mainland in that conflict .
\olhat prou.J?ts me to make these observations at this time, Mr.
President, is that they may be of more than historic interest in the light
of the present Sino-Soviet estrangement .

This break cernes at a time when

there has emerged in Peking once again, a strong centralization of Chinese
power.
Marxism.

To be s·.u-e, the government vrhich wields this power proclaims its
Indeed, it claios to be more Marxist than Moscow.

Yet insofar

as Chinese Marxism is expressed in practice on the borders of China, it
appears to bear a remarkable resemblance to classic Chinese dynastic policy.
There are strong iLdications, for example, that the present
Chinese

gover~~ent

is not disposed to regard any of its borders- -at least

none fixed after the time of the advanced decay of the Ching Dynasty--as
permanently constricting on the

.·

o~tward

extension of its power.

That such

is the case is indicated by the Chinese assertion in Korea, in Viet Nam,
in Laos, in Tibet and beyond Tibet into Ladakh

a~d

the Northeast Frontier

Agency at the two extremities of the I ndian sub-continent.
vlhat, then, of the Sino-Soviet border regions?
to be affected by the reassertion of Chinese power?

Are these, teo,

I have already referred

to the recession of Soviet influence in Manchuria and Sinkiang, although

- 7 to what extent and ho1-1
degree of precision .

vultmt~rily

it has occurred, we do not know with any

But whatever its extent, it would be a relatively

minor recession should the Chinese assertion against the U.S.S.R., in time,
parallel its policies with regard to Korea, Southeast Asia and the ChineseIndian border region.

If there is this parallel then the Chinese claim

against the U.S .S . R. could conceivably extend out of Sinkiang, through the
Soviet Pamirs to Afghanistan.

It could also embrace all of Outer Mongolia

and the Soviet Maritime Provinces along the Pacific.

For these areas fell

within the reach of Manchu China in the heyday of the dynasty .
It is interesting to note in this connection, Mr. President, that
when Mr . Khrushchev, late last year, taunted the Chinese Communists for
accepting the presence of colonialists in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao while
urging him to act against the United States, he was answered in an editorial
on March 8 in the Chinese People's Daily and Red Flag which reads in part
as follows:

"During the hunfu'ed or so years preceding the victorious

Chinese Revolution, the colonial and imperialistic powers - -the USA, Great
Britain, France, Czarist Russia, Germany, Japan, Italy, Austria, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal--became unreservedly engaged in a
campaign of aggression against China.

They imposed on the various

of the old China numerous unequal treaties:

regim~s

The Treaty of Nanking in 1842;

the Treaty of Aigun in 1858; the Treaty of Tsientsin in 1858; the Treaty of
Peking in 1860; the Treaty of Ili in 1881; the Convention for the Extension
of Hong

Ko~

in 1898; the Treaty of 1901; etc . . ..

By virtue of these

unequal treaties, they annexed Chinese territory in the North, South, East
and West; or they caused territories to be ceded to them on lease along
the coast of China and even in the Chinese hinterland .. ..

When the People's

Republic of China was founded in 1949, our Government clearly stated its

- 8 intention of eventually re-examining all

th~

treaties concluded by previous

Chinese regimes with foreign governoents and, according to their respective
texts, either recognizing, denouncing, revising or renegotiating them at
the appropriate time. 11
Note, Mr. PreGident, the reference in this catalogue of unequal
treaties to the Treaty of Aigun which fixed the present-day boundaries in
Manchuria at China's expense and to Russia's advantage.
junctio~

therewith this paragraph in the same editorial:

And note in con"Certain persons

(an obvious reference to Mr. Khrushchev) would like us to raise the quPstion
of the unequal treaties here and now....

Have they realized ,.,hat the con-

sequences of this might be?"
The implication is clear,

~tr. Preside~t.

~le

Chinese regard

certain Soviet territories no less than Hong Kong and Macao and Formosa as
having been taken inequitably from China and subject, therefore, to
Chinese claim.
Now, f{r. President, I do not wish to leave the impression that
China is about to embark upon a general war with Russia to bring back into
the historic embrace of Peking, certain lands along the inner Asian borders.
But I do suggest that the arro\-r-tips of Chinese influence are already
pointed outward from Peking into these sparsely inhabited regions whose
predominant population is neither Chinese nor Russian but Mongol and other
tribal peoples .

Many techniques are already apparently operating to this

end including the Chinese aid-programs in Outer Mongolia and the organization
of automonous tribal groupings on Chinese territory.

Certainly such limited

information as we have with respect to the region hint at the likelihood
that the Chinese arrows have begun to prick the Russians in these remote
regions.
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I would su3gest further, Mr . President, that Soviet foreign policy
is not formed in ignorance of these recent developments or the history '"hich
I have just recounted, or of the actions of the Chinese in Southeast Asia
and on

t~e

Indian border.

And there is no reason to assume that because it

is Communist, Russian foreign policy is concerned any less with such considerations than might be the case with the foreign policy of any other nation.
I would suggest, finally , that it is becoming apparent that we
have been in error in assuming for so long that the iron-hand of Moscow was
so unshakeably fixed on Peking that it had superceded all other factors for
all time in the considerations of the

Cc~-r.unist

leaders in Chi&le.

Theoretical

Con;munist world unity, '1-Thatever its weig"lt, Pas not replaced certain enduring
factors in the relationships of Rus3ia aAld China as they are indicated to
us by history.
And one of these factors, perhaps, the most significant, as I
have tried to explain to the Senate today , is the convergence of Russian
and Chinese influence in the vast inner recesses of Asia.

The problems

w!:ich are posed by the convergence are not essentially those of Ha.rxist
theory .

And they certainly are not those of a. common border dispute, that

is, whether to move the markers a. few yards or a. few miles in one direction
or the other .

What is involved is the ultimate disposition and utilization

of a reserve of millions of square miles of territory,largely devoid of
human habitation.
This land and its contents constitute an enormous and largely
unexplored and unexploited resource.

Hereto~ore ,

it may have been of minor

importance because of the inadequacies in techniques of modern development
and transportation, particularly in that part of the world.

But with the

rapid dissemination and multiplication of these techniques, the region
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grows rapidly in significance to the two great peoples which converge upon
it.

And it grows, teo, in significance, as the population of China, already

in the vicinity of 700 millions, expends

eA~losively

and presses ever mere

heavily on limited resources even for a bare minimum of food, clothing and
shelter.
So, Mr. President, if we wish to understand fully the motives of
the Soviet Union in seeking a nuclear test ban treaty, we ought not to
overlook the factor of the Si no-Soviet convergence, a factor which is
clearly indicated by history but which cannot be weighed accurately without
a better

~derstanding

of wnat is presently transpiring in interior Asia.

In any event, it would be unwise to dismiss the l ikelihood of a
growth of tension at various points of contact along the thousonds of miles
of this vague frontier .

Some might anticipate with relish the prospects of

these clashes, even if they were nuclear .

That prospect might be bent and

twisted, I suppose, into an argument against tha proposed

Trea~J

to ban

nuclear tests.
But that, Mr. President, ,.,ould be a most distorted vie,., of nuclear
real ities and contemporary international relations.

For, if the flames of a

great nuclear conflagration are lit, it will matter little who holds the
match or where in the wor ld it is struck.

Even the vastness of Central Asia

woul d be insufficient to contain the holocaust or to confine it to the two
massive Communist powers of Eurasia .

No, Mr . President, the probability of

increasing tension in the Sino-Soviet convergence, as in the case of all
significant international tensions, is one more reason for seeking to bring
about rational control over the growth and spread of the immense destructive
power of nuclear weapons.
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Rather than an argument against this Treaty, then, this probable
tension in Sino-Soviet relations is an argument for this nation to seek to
improve its comprehension of the actual situation which exists in Central
Asia.

For that region and what transpires iu it is likely to have a most

profound significance in a world in which the peace and security of this
nation is closely interwoven with that of all others .

